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Question 1 Explain Descartes' mind-body dualism. Do you think Descartes successfully resolved mind-body problem? Give reason to support your answer.

→ The mind-body problem is how the mind and the body are interrelated. It is commonly seen the most certain problem in philosophy of mind.

Descartes is famous and is celebrated for his position on the nature of mind and body. But he is not the inventor of the problem of mind-body interaction. A dualistic stand on reality could be traced back to the works of Plato.

Descartes claimed in the Discourse that the mind-body distinction, directly followed from the cogito argument. Descartes claimed that mind could survive without the body and as per the definition of substance, nothing other than things which exists in such a way as to depend on no other things of its existence fall in to this category. For Descartes, the substance in particular has attributes as well. Mind has thought as its property and extension is that of the matter. Mind and body were considered separate by Descartes, as the two, he believed could exist independently.

The distinction is made based on their completely different nature. In the second meditation, Descartes argues that he is nothing but a thinking thing or being and it makes no sense to ascribe such modes to entirely extended and thoughtless things in the world. And also it is senseless to ascribe the properties of shape, weight or motion to the thinking, non-extended being. Though, he opines, in this world the two cannot be entirely separate, he failed to provide a satisfactory answer to how the two interacted.

Thus, Descartes' mind-body doctrine combines substance dualism. Dualism of mind and body each conceived as an independent substance, with the idea that there is causal interaction between the two.

Question 2

A Do you agree that animal has consciousness? Give reasons to support your answer.

→ There are many reasons for philosophical interest in non-human animal consciousness. First, if philosophy often begins with questions about the place of human in nature one way humans have attempted to locate themselves is by comparison and contrast with other things in nature.

most similar to themselves, other animals.

The glimpse of consciousness in non-human animals is further proved while looking at how far the other animals have a sense of self. The standard method of demonstrating an understanding of the self and other distinction is the mirror test. It is to see if the animals recognize themselves in a mirror reflection. Roughly most of the time animals take the reflection for some other animals. Higher animals like elephants, apes and dolphins really succeed in understanding their reflection in the mirror. All three respond appropriately when they look in a mirror after a spot of paint is applied to their forehead or another part of their body. Apes and elephants will reach up to touch the mark with finger or trunk rather than reach out to touch the reflection.

Dolphins will position themselves so they can see the reflection of the mark better. If you put a bracelet on an orangutan and put it in front of a mirror it doesn't just look at the bracelet says Bhagavan Anil.

Ultimately, the same biological knob that adjust animal consciousness up or down ought to govern how we value the way those species experience their lives.

Q 2

B

What are the ethical implications of denying mind to the animals?

→ The moral implications of denying mention of felt pain to animals have come heavily on the unfortunate animals as we happen to see today. Numerous initiatives for the fact the treatments that are meted out to the animals are not that rare and that they do not deserve that.

The ethical formula that pervaded animal use during this period was avoiding deliberate, unnecessary, sadistic cruelty or outrageous neglect of animals such as not feeding and watering them. This ethical approach is seen clearly stated in the sacred texts of major religions. Hurting animals was considered equal to that of hurting humans. And this is well presented in the criminal laws of every civilized society since the 1800s.

Industry supplanted husbandry and agriculture became exploitative rather than symbiotic. Animal welfare was served from productivity and profit. And with the industrial model came the irrelevance of animal thoughts and feeling, yielding what is aptly called animal machines.

Cartesian model of animals as non-conscious, biological machines must have given an ~~input~~ impetus to the most extreme and morally relevant fact of denying ideologically and completely disregarding felt pain in animals. The animals might feel pain though they may not have a concept that they have pain. An phenomenal aspect cannot be denied and it must be the same with the case of having mental state. We know there cannot be a quality difference when it comes to the animal and human mind. But we know they differ in some way. In the next section, we will look at what really differentiates between mind in humans and animals.

Question 3

a Write an essay on the Wittgenstein's account of understanding.

→ It is generally believed that understanding, like thinking is a mental process. According to Wittgenstein 'we have to study language in which certain phenomena are spoken about, but not the phenomena themselves. As regards human tendency, Wittgenstein holds: where our language suggests a body and there is none, there we should like to say, is a spirit. The reason of that tendency is that we normally deal with physical objects in simple manner. The paradigmatic interpretation of any real things is that it is a physical thing. But whenever we come across things that are not physical such as minds, sensation and so on, we tend to make negative bodies without any solidity and substantially.

Normally we consider meaning something as a mental act. What sort of mental act is it? A person maybe deeply engrossed in some work and inadvertently he may hurt somebody's feelings by saying something offhandedly. Later on he says that he did not mean it. What goes on in a person's mind when he says something and means it but does not go on when he says something and does not mean it?

The point Wittgenstein tries to drive home is that saying something and meaning it is not at all like saying something and scratching or saying something and sitting down. What could possibly go on in one's own mind that would count as meaning it? The search for what goes on in one's mind when he says that 'I mean it' is a useless search, for to mean something, is not a mental process. If to mean something is mental process occurring privately in one's mind like a thought, an emphasis, an image, then it is private to oneself. Under this circumstance one cannot know when someone was meaning something and when he was not.

3f what are the presuppositions of Sphota-vada? Discuss.

→ Sabda has two aspects; Sphota (manifest) and dhvani (Sound). According to Panini former is permanent element in the word and the latter is the actualised and ephemeral element and an attribute to the former. The potency to manifest may be single letter or fixed pattern of letters but it remains constant and not affected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Dhvani involves utterance with individual particularity. These two aspects of word correspond to prakara and Vachana of later Grammarians.

The Grammarians hold that the relationship between word and meaning is given mental, positive and objective. The word refers to fourfold entities; substance, quality, activity and universal. Reflecting on the nature of Sphota, Bhartrhari explains it given (vitya), timeless, invariant, part less and non sequential. It is that entity that reveals the meaning. It is abstract level of sound and meaning both.

Bhattachari explains how at different stage of var, his notion of Sphota functions. Bhartrhari visualises three stage of var *parvanti*, *madhyama* and *vikhari*. At the level of *parvanti* sphota exists as an undifferentiated and non sequential entity. Sphota and its meaning, lie dormant in the potential form. And it is initiated by the desire of speaker to communicate. At the *madhyama* level it functions as abstract meaning and abstract form. Sphota and meaning are still one but speaker perceive them as distinct. All the linguistic elements are present in the latent form here. The speaker is also able to recognise the articulated speech as distinct and separate from sphota. At the *vikhari* level actual speech sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by listener.

Question 4

B Discuss the idea of intentionality.

The rich concept of intentionality, taken from phenomenology, is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards or be in relation with something in the external world. This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem; natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen. It would not make any sense to say that a natural state be natural processes. The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true then idea is true, otherwise it is false.

4C what is machine functionalism? Explain briefly.

The central idea that hold machine functionalism is the computational view of mind. In functionalism the mind is device capable of performing particular sorts of operations. A state of mind resembles a computational state and is at least to some extent, shorable in principle by any number of material system. The point is that minds bear a relation to their material embodiments analogous to the relation computer programmes bear to the device on which they run. Perhaps every program is embodied in some material device or the other.

Machine functionalism is also committed to a distinction of ontological levels. For functionalism, a given computational operation can be realised in a variety of distinct material devices. It can be realised as a vacuum tubes and relays in a device consisting of silicon and transistors, even in a hydraulic device consisting of water filled tubes and valves. According to Machine functionalists, a mental state may be realised in a variety of systems not only in human system.

4 D

What is substance dualism? Explain briefly.

Substance dualism claims that there are just different types of substances, not just predicates or properties. Here substance is understood as something more than the collection of properties it possesses. It is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, that which has them, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. The substance dualists argue that the mind is an independent substance and the property dualists argue that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain.

4 G →

Critically evaluate Kant's understanding of perception.

Perception is a process of the consciousness of an object. It is one of the means of valid knowledge in the world and consists in an inseparable relation of the perceptive consciousness with its content. Kant in his theses gives the following points on perception -

- 1) That, it is mind itself that necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to its knowledge.
- 2) That this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological.
- 3) That philosophy involves self-critical activity.

Kant maintains that our understanding of external world had its foundation not merely in experience, but in both experience and a priori concepts, thus offering a non-suspensivist critique of rationalist philosophy, which is what he and others referred to as his 'Copernican Revolution'. Kant asserts that experience is based both upon the perception of external objects and priori knowledge. Kant writes that it is the external world that provides those things which we sense. It is our mind though that processes this information about the world and gives it order, allowing us to comprehend it. Our mind supplies the conditions of space and time to experience objects.

Question 5

A

Volition as Adaptive Decision Making

Volition amounts to the property of being a self-directed actor in the world, possessing some ongoing autonomous behaviour where autonomous means that the behavior of the system is best explained by internal means rather than external factors. But this seems too permissive a criterion; it eliminates rocks and other inert objects, but allows clocks, plants, and even conceivably bodies of water to be counted as possessing volition. Volition involves the ability to choose actions based on values or goals. Another way of stating this is to say that volition entails the capacity for adaptive decision-making. Decision-making implies that differences in the environment and one's internal state select-behavior. Adaptive decision making implies

selection of behaviors that are conducive to meeting goals which will either be those of approach or of avoidance. An increase in the capacity for adaptive decision-making, then, would mean that the system would effectively control more of the processes for choosing one behavior vs. the other possible behaviors, and as a result of the increased flexibility, the adaptivity.

5B

Innate Structure of language

Mentalists especially Fodor and Chomsky argue that there is innate structure of language in mind which is prior to natural language. And it accounts for regularity and stability in language by providing universal rules of grammar. But Wittgenstein and Davidson hold that thought without language is impossible.

Recent development in cognitive science such as representational theory of mind and computational theory of mind have been centered on the innate capacities of mind/brain to process information. These theories put forward a mechanical interpretation of mind. Accordingly, mind is viewed as a computer whose primary function is to manipulate symbols on the basis of specific rules. Mind like computer functions with its software programme and hardware device. And mind is related to brain the way computer programmes are related to the hardware. Mind is not identifiable with or reducible to brain for the reason that programmes (computer operations) are not identified with or reducible to the hardware on which they function. The mental operations take place only if human mind/brain have some innate structure of language or grammar.

5E

Epiphenomenalism —

If we suppose that the physical and mental are distinct, this does open up the prospects for disembodied survival. At any rate, it refutes a main objection against disembodied survival. However, disembodied survival requires more than both dualism and substance dualism. After all one might agree that the brain and the mind are distinct, but one might say that the mind nonetheless depends on the brain for its functioning and in that case disembodied survival would not be possible. The epiphenomenalist says that while brain states and mental states are distinct, the brain is the cause of mental states but mental states exert no causal influence on brain states. At a certain point in its complex physical processes, the brain is able to generate consciousness, but this is a one-way causal relation.

Question 5
F

Property dualism

Property dualism is a type of dualism. Property dualism is in fact substance monist; it agrees with materialism that there are only physical substances. However, it concedes to the dualist that these substances have both physical and non-physical properties and that the non-physical properties cannot be fully explained in purely physical terms.

Property dualism claims that there are only physical substances, some of which have mental properties. Property dualists say that the brain is a physical substance with physical and mental properties.

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physicalism

This theory proposes that everything is physical. The contemporary philosophers state the same as that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by the physical. The actual world and universe and everything in it, conforms to a certain condition the condition of being physical. Physicalists believe that mind is part of the material world. Physicalists but never deny that there are many items in the world that do not appear physical in the first glance like the items of biological or psychological or moral or social.